Why Pursuing Knowledge Is a Better-than-Chance Moral Bet

Self-correction is the asymmetry between the pro-Enlightenment and nihilistic or anti-Enlightenment moral risks.

In several previous articles, I have argued that the growth of knowledge, while not guaranteed to be morally good, has positive expected moral consequences. In other words, it is a morally good bet, so we should pursue it.

This is because we currently know sufficiently little about morality that improving our expected moral knowledge is currently a better investment than acting on our present understanding (or lack thereof) in any way that prevents or slows improvements to our knowledge. (I go into greater detail about this in my introduction to knowledge maximalism, my article on the moral principle of the Enlightenment, my article on Heinlein’s “Great Research” and MacAskill’s “Long Reflection,” and my article on Pascal’s Wager.)

This prescription has led some to ask why we should conclude that the growth of knowledge is good, rather than merely neutral or even counterproductive for achieving whatever really matters. What if we pursue the growth of knowledge in an effort to correct our moral misconceptions, only to discover that we have been rowing the boat in the wrong direction all along? Would we then have fared better not to embark on the journey of Enlightenment at all?

That is a possibility, but there is an asymmetry between the pursuit of knowledge and its opposite. The asymmetry should lead us to pursue the growth of knowledge, despite the risk that doing so is neutral or counterproductive. The asymmetry is this: The pursuit of knowledge tends toward self-correction, while the hindrance or prevention of the growth of knowledge does not.

You can think of the pursuit and rejection of knowledge as two columns on a table. Each column involves risk, but only the knowledge-seeking column contains a mechanism for self-correction.

That self-correction in the “pursuit of knowledge” column makes the risk less devastating in the knowledge-seeking column than it is in the knowledge-rejecting column. If you’re pursuing knowledge and it turns out to be evil to do so, your pursuit of knowledge at least pushes you in the direction of discovering your mistake, at which point you can change course. If you’re rejecting knowledge and it turns out to be evil to do so, your knowledge rejection is not pushing you toward self-correction. You’ll probably never discover your error or correct course, and if you somehow do, it is more likely to be despite your rejection of knowledge than because of it.

(Note: Pascal’s Wager is wrong primarily because it lacks this asymmetric advantage against some alternative wagers.)

Therefore, we should choose to be in the “pursuit of knowledge” column, despite the chance that it is neutral or counterproductive to do so.